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About…
he Federal Reserve Act, approved
by Congress on December 23,
1913 and signed later that same
day by President Woodrow
Wilson, created a central bank
with a unique “decentralized” structure: a
network of banks serving local districts with
national coordination by a Board of Governors
in Washington D.C. But when it came to lo-
cating the regional banks, both the cities where
they would operate and the districts they
would serve, the Act was intentionally vague,
offering only a few requirements: 
There would be between eight and 12
Federal Reserve districts.
The districts would “be apportioned with
due regard to the convenience and customer
course of business.”
A Reserve Organizing Committee com-
prised of the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of Agriculture and the Comp-
troller of the Currency would determine
the districts and designate “Federal
Reserve cities” where the regional banks
would be located. 
The act gave the committee a deadline to
complete their work “as soon as practicable.”
Realizing the scope of the task ahead, the
Committee took the somewhat ambiguous
deadline seriously, convening for the first time
three days later on Friday, Dec. 26.
“Nothing had aroused such scorn and
ridicule, nothing had been so fiercely fought in
Congress, nothing had so generally been pro-
nounced impossible, as the division of the
country into several banking districts in each
of which there should be a separate and inde-
pendent institution,” Henry Parker Willis
wrote in his 1923 book The Federal Reserve
System. “On no point had there been sharper
controversy than as to the issue whether banks
should be four, eight, twelve or some other
number. Yet this politically contested issue,
and the much more difficult problem (of) how
to construct the several banking districts, were
now to be quickly disposed of by a committee
which had scant time for theoretical inquiry or
practical observation.” 
And much of the work would be done by
only a partial committee. President’s Wilson’s
nominee for the Comptroller of Currency,
John Skelton Williams, would not be con-
firmed for several weeks, leaving the bulk of
the Committee’s work in the hands of
Agriculture Secretary David F. Houston and
Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo. 
Twelve districts
Although the number of Reserve Districts
was hotly debated prior to the Act’s approval, for
the Committee, the issue would be among the
first, and perhaps the easiest, to resolve. 
It “became obvious that if we created fewer
banks than the maximum fixed by law, the Re-
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nserve Board would have no peace till that num-
ber was reached,” Houston would later write.
For the more difficult questions on locat-
ing the Reserve Banks and determining the
Districts, the committee would seek input
through three initiatives:
Ballots were sent to 7,471 national banks
asking each their preferences for Reserve
Bank cities. 
A Preliminary Committee on Organization,
headed by Willis, was appointed to address
several issues related to the internal organi-
zation of the Federal Reserve. Willis, who
would go on to become the first secretary to
the Federal Reserve Board, would also pre-
pare some preliminary maps for the
Committee’s consideration.
The Reserve Organizing Committee began
a tour of the United States with a travel
schedule that might be considered aggres-
sive even by today’s standards. Over a six-
week span Houston and McAdoo would log
10,000 miles, convene hearings in 18 com-
munities, hear presentations from 37
would-be Federal Reserve cities and receive
5,000 pages of testimony.
The hearings would receive widespread media
attention. The testimony, which the Committee
likely envisioned as being focused on banking and
business relationships, was instead perhaps some-
what similar to a modern day municipality court-
ing a professional sports franchise.
Willis later wrote that the would-be Federal
Reserve cities saw in the new banking system a
means of self-aggrandizing or self-advertising.
“Much of the testimony and many of the
briefs that were filed read like land or travel
prospectuses in which the good gifts of
Providence to the different parts of the country
were enumerated in the most glowing colors,”
Willis wrote.
In an apparent attempt to try to refocus
the hearings, on repeated occasions McAdoo
publicly stated that a designation of Reserve
Bank city was not as important to future eco-
nomic development as some citizens appeared
to believe.
Houston would later write that it quick-
ly became clear they committee would be “in
for a great deal of roasting,” regardless of
their decisions.
“There was a vast amount of state and city
pride revealed to us in the hearings; and to hear
some of the speeches one would have thought
that not to select the city … would mean its ru-
in,” he wrote.
The committee would hear from three
cities in what would become the Tenth
Federal Reserve District: Kansas City, Omaha
and Denver.
On Jan. 23, 1914, The Associated Banks of
Greater Kansas City presented its plan for a
Federal Reserve District that included western
Missouri, southwest Iowa, all of Nebraska,
Kansas and Oklahoma, the northern half of
Texas, western Arkansas, all of New Mexico and
all of Colorado.
“Kansas City with her splendid railroad
facilities and excellent mail service, has be-
come the natural market, financial and dis-
tributing center of the riches and most rapidly
developing agricultural and mineral district in







The Tenth Federal Reserve District includes western
Missouri, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Wyoming,
Colorado and northern New Mexico.
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“would be a commanding institution with
ample capital and deposits to protect and
properly care for the legitimate business needs
of this district,” the bankers said.
The following day, the committee moved
on to Lincoln, Neb. where the Banks of Omaha
and South Omaha suggested an Omaha-based
Reserve District encompassing western Iowa,
southern South Dakota, a northern tier of
Kansas, and all of Nebraska, Montana, Idaho,
Wyoming, Colorado and Utah. 
On February 9, Denver made its bid for a
Reserve Bank with a presentation calling for a
district bounded on the east by the 100th merid-
ian that bisects Nebraska and cuts across western
Kansas. For the western edge of its proposed dis-
trict, the Denver contingent proposed a line near
the eastern boundaries of Washington, Oregon.
They proposed a district spanning nearly 1,200
miles from north to south, covering the country
from border to border.
The decision
A few Reserve Bank cities were obvious
choices for the Committee. New York,
Chicago and St. Louis were major population
centers already serving as reserve cities in the
national banking system. To some degree, the
committee’s challenge was then to fill in the
rest of the nation.
In its report, the Reserve Bank Organization
Committee spelled out its selection criteria:
The ability of the member banks within the
district to provide the minimum capital of
$4 million required for each Reserve Bank
by law.
Existing mercantile, industrial and financial
connections.
The probable ability of the Reserve Bank to
meet demands placed upon it.
The fair and equitable division of available
capital among the districts.
Geographical factors including transporta-
tion and communication.
The population, area and prevalent business
activities of the district.
In the Tenth Federal Reserve District, the
boundary lines were very similar to what was
proposed by the Kansas City bankers.
“The region in the middle and far West
presented problems of difficulty,” the committee 
wrote. “Careful consideration was given to the
claims of Omaha, Lincoln, Denver and Kansas
City, which conflicted in this region.”
In announcing the decision, the
Committee noted the results of the banker bal-
loting. Kansas City received the most first
place votes within the District: 355, followed
by Omaha, 191 and Denver, 132. The
Committee also noted that the  vast majority
of banker support for both Denver and Omaha
was confined to their respective states while
Kansas City enjoyed wider support including
substantial backing in Kansas and Oklahoma.
“It seemed impossible to serve the great sec-
tion from Kansas City to the mountains in any
other way than by creating a district with Kansas
City as the headquarters,” the committee wrote,
noting also that Kansas City was the region’s
“dominant banking and business center.”
“The relations of that territory on the whole
are much more largely with Kansas City than
with any other city in the Middle West with
which it could have been connected,” the com-
mittee wrote, noting that most of the trade
moved toward the east.
The committee completed its work in 98
days. By November 16, 1914, less than a year af-
ter McAdoo and Houston convened their first
meeting, the nation’s “decentralized” central
bank opened for business in all 12 districts.








Nothing had so generally been pronounced impossible, 
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